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PAVING THE LEGAL PATH FOR CARBON 
SEQUESTRATION FROM COAL 
VICTOR B. FLATT† 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Of the many environmental and natural resource challenges that 
face President Obama, a large one has received scant attention from 
environmental scholars: coal.  In the environmental community, 
coal—dirty, polluting coal—is more of an epithet than a resource.  It 
has been the bane of environmentalists since the early days of the 
Clean Air Act,1 and its reputation has only gotten worse with the 
recognition that carbon dioxide (CO2), a major cause of climate 
change, is produced by coal at a higher ratio per energy output than 
other fossil fuels.2  Many environmental organizations propose 
eliminating coal entirely from our energy mix.3  However, coal 
represents forty-nine percent of the Unites States’ existing electric-
generating capacity, and will likely remain an important source of 
 
† Tom and Elizabeth Taft Distinguished Visiting Professor of Environmental Law, UNC-Chapel 
Hill; A.L. O’Quinn Chair in Environmental Law, and Director, Center for Environment, 
Energy, and Natural Resources Law at the University of Houston Law Center.  This article 
depends on research and work conducted by the Program for Interagency Environmental 
Cooperation at the University of Houston Center for Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources Law, under the supervision of the author, Professor Victor B. Flatt.  In particular, 
this article depends on research conducted by Linda Hester, Mollie Blasingame, Alison Bradley, 
Ben Rhem, Jamie Mauldin, Jennifer Anderson, Carlos Moreno, Jennifer Chiang, Jennifer 
Hardegree, Kimberly Hill, and Holly Reuter.  Parts of the article repeat conclusions from that 
research.  The culmination of that research was a proposed draft of comprehensive federal 
legislation for Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS).  This article supports this draft as a way to 
address the policy issues inherent in CCS.  The draft legislative proposal for comprehensive 
Carbon Capture and Sequestration and white paper explaining that proposal can be found at 
www.law.uh.edu/EENRCenter. 
 1. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q) (2000). 
 2. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981); 
David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air, the Duty of Care in Climate Change 
Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1779 n.145 (2007) (citations omitted). 
 3. Greenpeace, Project Hotseat: Dangerous Distractions, http://us.greenpeace.org/site/ 
PageNavigator/hotseat/PHS_Dangerous_Distractions (last visited Mar. 16, 2009); Sierra Club, 
Stopping the Coal Rush, http://www.sierraclub.org/environmentallaw/coal/ (last visited Mar. 16, 
2009). 
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energy in the near and intermediate term.4  Even more importantly, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that 
fossil fuels (primarily coal) will dominate world energy until at least 
the middle of the next century.5  Of particular concern is the fact that 
China, the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs),6 
depends heavily on coal-fired generation, and has relatively more coal 
than other energy sources to exploit in its continued meteoric 
growth.7 
Additionally, in the absence of federal policy on controlling 
GHGs, much uncertainty surrounds whether and to what extent coal-
fired generation can be permitted at all.  There have been many 
instances of state utility regulators, legislators, and governors vetoing 
the permitting of new coal-fired electricity generating facilities;8 and 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) appeals board recently 
denied a permit for a new coal-fired plant because the permitting 
region, Region 8, had not set out a reasoned opinion on whether CO2 
is a “pollutant subject to regulation” under the Clean Air Act.9  While 
these rejections of coal-fired power may be appropriate responses to 
the linkage between coal-fired power and GHG production, without 
being a part of a larger energy plan, they may lead to energy 
shortages and other unintended consequences.  According to the 
International Energy Agency’s 2008 Energy Technology Perspectives 
Executive Summary, coal will continue to be part of a future energy 
mix, and carbon capture and storage will generate approximately 
nineteen percent of the GHG reductions necessary to stabilize 
 
 4. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL 2007, at 2 
(2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf. 
 5. Edward Rubin et al., Technical Summary, in INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON 
CLIMATE CHANGE SPECIAL REPORT, CARBON DIOXIDE CAPTURE AND STORAGE 20 (2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_technicalsummary.pdf [hereinafter 
IPCC, CARBON CAPTURE REPORT]. 
 6. Patricia Ross McCubbin, China and Climate Change: Domestic Environmental Needs, 
Differentiated International Responsibilities, and Rule of Law Weaknesses, 3 U. HOUST. ENVTL. 
& ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 200, 201 (2009). 
 7. Edward H. Ziegler, China’s Cities, Globalization, and Sustainable Development: 
Comparative Thoughts on Urban Planning, Energy, and Environmental Policy, 5 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 295, 300 (2006). 
 8. Felicity Barringer, States’ Battles Over Energy Grow Fiercer With U.S. in a Policy 
Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2008, at A18. 
 9. In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD Permit No. PSD-OU-0002-04.00, PSD Appeal 
No. 07-03, slip op. at 9–10 (E.A.B. Nov. 13, 2008) (order denying review in part and remanding 
in part), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/OA/EAB_WEB_Docket.nsf/Filings%20By% 
20Appeal%20Number/C8C5985967D8096E85257500006811A7/$File/Remand...39.pdf. 
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atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide at 450 parts per million 
(ppm).10 
Therefore, it will be imperative for President Obama to figure 
out what role coal will play in our nation’s future energy mix, and 
what role coal will have in other countries, since coal will continue to 
impact worldwide emissions of GHGs.  Given the “Scylla” of 
increasing GHGs and the “Charybdis”11 of the need to replace almost 
half of the United States’ and the world’s energy production if coal is 
banned, it is imperative that the United States move toward either 
reducing coal usage as quickly as possible around the world by 
ramping up other cost-effective energy sources, or figuring out a way 
to continue to produce coal-based electric power while drastically 
reducing GHG emissions. 
The option that has received the most attention is the latter, 
particularly in finding a way to sequester the carbon dioxide produced 
by coal-fired emissions and prevent it from entering the atmosphere 
and contributing to increasing GHGs.  This process, referred to as 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), can potentially remove eighty to 
ninety-five percent of the CO2 emitted from electric power plants.
12  
Though CO2 is routinely injected underground to aid in recovery of 
oil, and though large-scale underground sequestration sites have been 
identified in the United States,13 there is not yet a commercial-scale 
CO2 sequestration facility attached to a large coal-fired power plant.
14  
Therefore, most of the research on this issue has focused on the 
technical and economic difficulties of cost effective CCS.15  While this 
 
 10. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, ENERGY TECHNOLOGY PERSPECTIVES IN SUPPORT OF THE 
G8 PLAN OF ACTION 5 fig.ES.2 (2008), 
available at www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/ETP2008SUM.pdf. 
 11. Scylla and Charybdis are monsters of the Sicilian Sea in classical mythology, with one 
on one side and one on the other, creating a difficult path through which to navigate.  THE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 519 (Hugh Chisholm ed., 11th ed. 1911). 
 12. PAUL W. PARFORMAK & PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CARBON 
DIOXIDE (CO2) PIPELINES FOR CARBON SEQUESTRATION: EMERGING POLICY ISSUES 1 (2007), 
available at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07May/RL33971.pdf. 
 13. See NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION 
ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA (2008), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/ 
technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/atlasII/atlasII.pdf. 
 14. Ann E. Carlson, Implementing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Caps: A Case Study of the 
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1479, 1501–02 (2008). 
 15. A Google “web scholar” search on December 9, 2008, revealed about 7000 scholarly 
articles on the economic and technological feasibility of large-scale carbon sequestration, and 
2150 articles for a similar search for legal and regulatory feasibility of large-scale carbon 
sequestration. 
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is obviously necessary to deploy CCS effectively, there are also legal 
issues that must be addressed to facilitate the adoption of CCS as a 
viable technology.  These legal issues have received less attention.16  
The most important focus on the regulatory and legal issues to date 
has come from the work of the Advance Coal Technology Work 
Group, convened by the EPA.17  This has culminated in a proposed 
rule by the EPA to regulate CO2 sequestration through the 
Underground Injection Permit program of the Safe Drinking Water 
Act.18 
In addition, as of 2005, fourteen states have enacted state carbon 
sequestration legislation, with numerous other proposals pending.19  
Coal-fired power plants are also regulated by the Federal Electric 
Regulatory Commission (FERC), and by various state Public Utility 
Commissions.20  While the EPA’s proposed rule and some of the 
states’ legislation may be a stop-gap way to address CO2 
sequestration, there are many issues, including state and federal 
regulatory overlap, ownership, and liability, that would be more 
effectively addressed through new comprehensive federal 
legislation.21  If President Obama wishes to accelerate the bringing to 
market of CCS for use in the United States and other parts of the 
world, he must focus on legislation that can legally pave the way.  
This legislation should address licensing of sequestration and electric-
generating facilities, ownership and property law, liability, 
 
 16. One notable exception is Alexandra Klass & Elizabeth Wilson, Climate Change and 
Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 
58 EMORY L.J. 103, 107 (2008) (exploring liability issues with respect to adequately protecting 
the public). 
 17. See ADVANCED COAL TECH. WORK GROUP, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL 
REPORT (2008), available at http://www.epa.gov/air/caaac/coaltech/2008_01_final_report.pdf 
[hereinafter COAL FINAL REPORT]. 
 18. Proposed Federal Requirements under the Underground Injection Control (UIC) 
Program for Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Geologic Sequestration (GS) Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,610 
(proposed Nov. 21, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 144, 146). 
 19. MELISSA CHAN & SARAH FORBES, CARBON SEQUESTRATION ROLE IN STATE AND 
LOCAL ACTIONS 6–7 tbl.1 (2005), available at http://www.netl.doe.gov/energyanalyses/pubs/ 
slfinal_1.pdf. 
 20. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2000); see also LOUIS B. SCHWARTZ ET AL., FREE ENTERPRISE 
AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: GOVERNMENT REGULATION 32 (6th ed. 1985). 
 21. In its Report to Congress: Framework for Geological Carbon Sequestration on Public 
Land, the U.S. Department of the Interior recently concluded that existing federal and state 
legislation is sufficient to handle the sequestration of CO2 on public lands.  U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS: FRAMEWORK FOR GEOLOGICAL CARBON SEQUESTRATION 
ON PUBLIC LAND 13–14 (2009).  Nevertheless, the report noted the complexity and possible 
legal confusion concerning issues of liability, pore space, and transport.  Id. at 1–2, 13–15. 
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applicability and possible preemption of federal and state 
environmental laws, and ancillary issues such as pipeline construction 
and permitting, and the special case of offshore sequestration.  The 
legislation should also clarify jurisdictional terms, such as “geologic 
sequestration” and “storage facility.”  Building on work done by the 
Program for Interagency Environmental Cooperation at the 
University of Houston,22 this article explores some of the major legal 
issues affecting CCS and proposes policies to address them. 
Due to their importance, this article particularly focuses on the 
need to address jurisdiction (what is CCS and how it should be 
permitted), liability (who is responsible for any harm), and property 
rights (who owns the various pieces of a CCS system).  This article 
concludes with other areas that should be addressed in detail by 
future scholars. 
Neither this article nor the work of the Program for Interagency 
Environmental Cooperation necessarily gives the “best” answer to 
addressing legal and regulatory barriers, but they do give some 
answers and focus to the problem. 
II.  JURISDICTION 
One of the most critical concerns in regulatory barriers to CCS 
deployment is clarifying what qualifies as CCS and, therefore, what 
CCS legislation should address.  Additionally, choices must be made 
as to how such legislation should be implemented.  Specifically, 
legislation must address whether the federal government or the states 
should primarily regulate CCS, and what regulatory agency should be 
assigned, or created, to oversee comprehensive CCS. 
A.  Definitions 
Clearly defining what constitutes CCS, and thus what is to be 
regulated, is the first jurisdictional step.  Carbon dioxide must be 
defined in terms of purity.  In other words, what kind of a gas stream 
should be sequestered?  While pipelines and geologic formations may 
be able to contain CO2, they may be less able to contain other air 
pollutants or toxics.23  Additionally, the term “geologic sequestration” 
 
 22. See University of Houston Law Center, Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources 
Center, http://www.law.uh.edu/eenrcenter/Interagency.html (last visited May 19, 2009).  For 
more information regarding the Program for Interagency Environmental Cooperation’s 
proposed draft of comprehensive legislation for CCS, see www.law.uh.edu/EENRCenter. 
 23. See Press Release, PR Newswire, Oxyfuel Technology Solutions for Carbon Capture 
Presented by Air Products at Greenhouse Gas International Conference (Nov. 19, 2008) 
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must be defined.  What constitutes successful sequestration in terms 
of purity and years stored?24  Legislation should make this clear.  For 
instance, the term could be defined as “underground storage in a 
reservoir for at least 1000 years of at least 90% of the carbon dioxide 
emitted from a capture facility, with a storage failure rate of no more 
than 1% volume loss in 1000 years.”25  Additional terms that should 
be defined include “capture facility,” “carbon dioxide pipelines,” 
“injection,” “reservoir,” “site,” and “storage facility,” as well as words 
that may need their meaning clarified in this context, such as 
“operator,” “Indian Tribe,” or “State.” 
B.  Federal Preemption 
There are significant limits on the availability of sites for carbon 
sequestration.  These limitations include both physical constraints on 
available sites and social constraints on sites based on public 
opposition.26  Geologic sequestration is accomplished by injecting CO2 
into encapsulated, porous, geological formations.27  Porous geological 
formations that hold, or have previously held, fluids such as natural 
gas, oil, or brines are potential candidates for CO2 storage.
28  Saline 
aquifers and formations, as well as un-minable coal seams, are also 
possible sequestration locations.29  While acceptable formations are 
often found near areas also appropriate for coal-fired power 
generation, this is not universally true.  The net effect is that there are 
only limited potential sites appropriate for CO2 geologic 
sequestration facilities.30 
 
(discussing technologies to purify a captured carbon dioxide stream), available at 
http://www.prnewswire.com/cgibin/stories.pl?ACCT=EMAGRCY.story&STORY=/www/story/
11-19-2008/0004929254&EDATE=WED+Nov+19+2008,+01:52+PM. 
 24. The Department of Energy’s National Energy Technology Laboratory assumes that 
sequestration should be “permanent.”  See Nat’l Energy Tech. Lab., Carbon Sequestration, 
http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/index.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2009). 
 25. THE PROGRAM TO FACILITATE INTERAGENCY ENVTL. COOPERATION, PROPOSED 
CARBON GEOLOGIC SEQUESTRATION LEGISLATION 4 (2008), available at http:// 
www.law.uh.edu/EENRcenter/documents/CCSProposedLegislation.pdf. 
 26. See generally IPCC, CARBON CAPTURE REPORT, supra note 5, at 33–34, 36 (estimating 
the storage capacity for several geologic storage options and noting that the public tends to view 
CCS less favorably than other climate change mitigation options). 
 27. See id. at 31. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Jeffrey W. Moore, The Potential Law of On-Shore Geologic Sequestration of CO2 
Captured from Coal-Fired Power Plants, 28 ENERGY L.J. 443, 454 (2007). 
 30. See NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 13. 
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One possibility for increasing the viable sites for carbon geologic 
sequestration facilities is to create a new infrastructure, or add to the 
existing infrastructure, for moving CO2.  Transporting captured CO2 
in small quantities is possible by truck, rail, or ship; however, large-
scale CO2 sequestration may require a dedicated interstate CO2 
pipeline network, which simply does not exist at this time.31  A recent 
Congressional Research Report on CO2 pipelines concluded that 
developing an “expansive national CO2 pipeline network . . . could 
pose numerous new regulatory and economic challenges.”32  Although 
CO2 pipeline technology has been employed historically to transport 
CO2 for oilfield recovery and CO2 pipelines operate much the same 
way as natural gas pipelines, only 5800 kilometers of CO2 pipeline is 
currently in operation in the United States.33  This relatively small 
regional network is inadequate for massive transportation of CO2 to 
distant geologic sequestration locations.  Pipelines of the future may 
gather CO2 from widespread sources and transport it to a central 
location for sequestration.  However, regulatory uncertainties 
regarding pipeline authority, as well as the difficulties of securing 
owners’ right of way, combined with the expense and difficulty of 
creating an extensive CO2 pipeline network, render it unlikely that 
full-scale reliance on CO2 transport through an interstate pipeline 
network will be an option until well into the future.  In the meantime, 
it seems likely that most CO2 sequestration will take place very near 
the point at which CO2 is captured, limiting location options.
34 
The promotion of sequestration also requires the permitting of 
new coal-fired power plants and plants that have access to suitable 
storage sites.  Permitting of a power plant typically requires approval 
from the entities that regulate utilities, which are normally equivalent 
to public utility commissions, and may also require a “necessity” 
determination and local environmental review.35  Additional review 
occurs at the federal level, including environmental review, and the 
FERC’s analysis of market power and monopolistic behavior.36  
 
 31. PARFORMAK & FOLGER, supra note 12, at 1. 
 32. Id. at 2. 
 33. Id. at 4–5. 
 34. See id. at 6 (concluding that seventy-seven percent of the total annual CO2 captured 
from the major North American sources will likely be stored directly below the sources, and 
that an additional eighteen percent may be stored within 100 miles of the source). 
 35. Jeffrey S. Dennis, Federalism, Electric Energy Restructuring, and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 43 NAT. RESOURCES. J. 615, 630 (2003). 
 36. Victor B. Flatt, What is the Best Formula to Protect the Environment in Electricity 
Restructuring?, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 221, 226 (2005); Mark N. Cooper, The 
Flatt_Fmt4.doc 7/6/2009  12:30:24 PM 
218 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. 19:211 
Carbon dioxide pipeline permitting similarly requires approval from 
whatever state and federal entities regulate that type of pipeline 
approval, as well as environmental, antitrust, and workplace safety 
approval.37 
Due to greater concern over climate change, coal-fired power 
plants have faced significant opposition in recent years, with very few 
obtaining approval at the state level.38  Thus, it is imperative to 
streamline the approval process for appropriately designed coal-fired 
generating facilities that incorporate capture and sequestration 
technology.  Recent experience suggests that even with advanced 
capture and sequestration technology incorporated into the coal-fired 
power plant designs, approval in appropriate locations will be difficult 
due to overlapping jurisdictions, lack of public awareness of CCS 
technology, and residual suspicion that CCS will not mitigate the 
climate change effects of coal fired power plants.39 
Each entity that has jurisdiction over CCS may have a way to 
veto a CCS project for reasons unrelated to the original purpose of 
the legal regime being used, such as necessity, safety, or the 
environment.  Thus, one federal agency, most likely the EPA, should 
be placed in charge of the permitting of all aspects of CCS.  Federal 
control will eliminate the current system of overlapping and 
potentially conflicting requirements for CO2 sequestration facilities. 
There is precedent for federal preemption of state site 
restrictions regarding the geologic storage of CO2.  Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) terminals allow for the transport and importation of 
 
Failure of Federal Authorities to Protect American Energy Consumers from Market Power and 
Other Abusive Practices, 19 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 315, 393 (2007). 
 37. Currently, non-natural gas interstate pipelines are regulated for safety and siting by the 
Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration (PHMA), and 
intrastate pipelines are regulated for safety and pricing by either public utility commissions or 
state mining commissions, depending on the eventual use of the carbon dioxide in question 
(though they may follow certain policies of the PHMA).  Depending on where a CCS facility 
was sited, the utility could require overlapping state and federal approval for pipeline safety, 
siting, and carrier pricing.  Philip M. Marston & Patricia A. Moore, From EOR to CCS: The 
Evolving Legal and Regulatory Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage, 29 ENERGY L.J. 
421, 449–50 (2008). 
 38. Judy Pasternak, Coal at Heart of Climate Battle: Environmental Groups Go to Court to 
Stop Each New Power Plant and Force Washington to Address the Issue, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 
2008, at A1. 
 39. See Greg Edwards, Proposed Coal Plant Denied: Virginia Regulators Say Proposal 
Neither Reasonable Nor Prudent, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Apr. 15, 2008, at B9 (reporting 
that the Virginia Corporation Commission denied approval for new power plant using coal 
gasification technology). 
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natural gas in concentrated liquid formation.40  Gas in liquefied form 
can be transported to places that are not connected by a pipeline so 
that it is not “stranded” in a low-demand market.41  However, LNG 
terminals are controversial and many communities have sought to 
exclude them entirely, despite the benefits.42  This sentiment has 
created what lawmakers deem to be unacceptable barriers to the 
expansion of on-shore LNG terminal capacity.43  Local and state land 
use and zoning restrictions were often utilized to resist LNG terminal 
sites.44  The Energy Policy Act of 2005 sought to reduce these barriers 
by modifying the siting process for LNG facilities and preempting 
local and state siting barriers by declaring that exclusive authority to 
site LNG facilities rested with the federal government: 
The Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or 
deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or 
operation of an LNG terminal.  Except as specifically provided in 
this chapter, nothing in this chapter is intended to affect otherwise 
applicable law related to any Federal agency’s authorities or 
responsibilities related to LNG terminals.45 
This provision has been upheld as a proper exercise of federal power 
under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.46 
While this preemption of local authority for siting was initially 
opposed by environmentalists, closer examination reveals that such 
preemption may be necessary to increase needed public infrastructure 
efficiently, without creating unequal burdens on so-called 
“environmental justice” communities.47 
Obviously, such preemption (for either LNG or CO2 
sequestration facilities) must be grounded in the notion that the 
operation of such facilities does not create unacceptable health and 
safety risks in communities with such sites.  Therefore, any 
 
 40. Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a National 
Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 57 n.55 (2008). 
 41. Josh Lute, LNG Terminals: Future or Folly, 43 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 621, 630 (2007). 
 42. See Eileen Gauna, LNG Facility Siting and Environmental (In)Justice: Is it Time for a 
National Siting Scheme?, 2 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 98–101 (2007). 
 43. Angela J. Durbin, Comment, Striking a Delicate Balance: Developing a New Rationale 
for Preemption While Protecting the Public’s Role in Siting Liquefied Natural Gas Terminals, 56 
EMORY L.J. 507, 509 (2006). 
 44. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 176 (2005). 
 45. Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (Supp. 2006). 
 46. AES Sparrows Point LNG, L.L.C. v. Smith, 470 F. Supp. 2d 586, 589 (D. Md. 2007) 
(striking down a zoning ordinance on LNG siting). 
 47. Gauna, supra note 42, at 106. 
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preemptive legislation must be explicit about health, safety, and 
environmental factors that must be met before any permit can be 
granted, and ensure that existing health, safety, and environmental 
policies are fully followed.  Thus, federal legislation must create a 
kind of permit system that addresses federal, state, and local 
concerns.48 
III.  LIABILITY MANAGEMENT 
One of the most formidable barriers facing potential CCS 
operations is the possible liability costs of these operations.  If the 
costs of CCS outweigh the benefits, it should not go forward and, 
generally, we rely on complex common law liability to send that 
market signal.49  However, liability is much more uncertain here, 
where economic signals do not operate efficiently.  Even though 
studies indicate that the benefits of large-scale CCS operations should 
be substantial and bring little risk of harm to humans or the 
environment,50 differing liability rules and regulations exist, creating 
an uncertainty that poses a problem in promoting CCS.51  CCS 
operators need some assurance that liability costs will not outweigh 
the benefit derived from implementing CCS operations.  Without this 
predictability, the threat of uncertain liability costs will likely deter a 
large number of potential operators.  Thus, it is necessary to create 
and adopt a liability scheme that encourages private industry to 
implement CCS operations, while protecting the public and the public 
interest. 
If liability issues are to be clarified by legislation, this legislation 
would have to ensure that the purposes of liability—protecting public 
health and safety, as well as property rights—are preserved.  
Although unlikely, large surface releases could pose health risks to 
 
 48. Even when done in this manner, preemption always poses a risk to local environmental, 
health, and safety protection.  The federal government, even with legal requirements to protect 
local health, environment, and safety, may not always adequately enforce these laws.  To avoid 
this problem, federal legislation should include a strong citizens’ suit provision for enforcement.  
While this could also be used solely for delay purposes, the trade-off may be necessary to 
protect the public’s interest. 
 49. See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1985) (noting that relative fault models (negligence with comparative 
negligent defense) are efficient). 
 50. See SARAH M. FORBES, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., REGULATORY BARRIERS FOR 
CARBON CAPTURE, STORAGE AND SEQUESTRATION 1 (2002), available at http:// 
www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/refshelf/reg-issues/capture.pdf. 
 51. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 123. 
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humans, such as asphyxiation or other effects caused by prolonged 
exposure to high concentrations of CO2.
52  Exposure to a 1% to 5% 
atmospheric CO2 mixture can result in physical effects including 
increased breathing; loss of consciousness usually occurs from 
exposure to greater than 10% atmospheric CO2; and most CO2 
concentrations above 30% are lethal.53  Furthermore, CO2 seepage 
could harm flora and fauna and potentially ruin nearby ecosystems 
and agriculture.54 
With respect to property protection, it is important to account 
for the nature of CO2 stored underground.  Like water and oil, CO2 is 
a “fugitive” substance.55  Thus, when CO2 is injected underground, it 
will naturally migrate throughout the pore space.56  This natural 
migration could lead CO2 to travel upward throughout the reservoir 
into undetected or abandoned portions of the reservoir, or into 
portions of the reservoir that are not owned by the operator.57  Even if 
it remains underground, CO2 could cause saline intrusion into potable 
aquifers, make sources of oil and gas unattainable, create pressure 
changes causing ground heave, and even trigger seismic events.58  
Even if there were no direct physical harm or trespass, a CO2 release 
would increase atmospheric CO2, which is a leading cause of climate 
change.  Thus, any liability scheme must also ensure that public 
health and private property rights will be protected and that any 
harms will be compensated. 
This article is not the first to explore the problems that potential 
liability may pose for the deployment of large-scale CCS.  The issue 
was identified by the Advanced Coal Technology Work Group as a 
major issue for deployment, and the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact 
Commission (IOGCC) has proposed releasing operators from long-
term liability for CCS. 59  Mark Anthony de Figueredo analyzed 
 
 52. Id. at 118. 
 53. See FORBES, supra note 50, at 5 (noting the 1986 disaster when CO2 released from a 
natural reservoir under Lake Nyos in Africa killed more than 1700 people). 
 54. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 119. 
 55. See Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). 
 56. See Mark Anthony de Figueiredo, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage 55 (Jan. 12, 
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology), available at 
http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/Mark_de_Figueiredo_PhD_Dissertation.pdf. 
 57. Id.; Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 115–16, 118. 
 58. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 119. 
 59. See COAL FINAL REPORT, supra note 17, at 3–4; IOGCC TASK FORCE ON CARBON 
CAPTURE AND GEOLOGIC STORAGE, STORAGE OF CARBON DIOXIDE IN GEOLOGIC 
STRUCTURES: A LEGAL AND REGULATORY GUIDE FOR STATES AND PROVINCES 11 (2007), 
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property rights and liability in his Ph.D. dissertation at MIT,60 and 
Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Wilson have explored liability options 
for CCS in their article, Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: 
Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon 
Dioxide.61  Both pieces provide extensive and excellent detail on 
liability options and issues.  This article treads similar ground and 
agrees and disagrees with some proposals mentioned in the pieces.  
However, this article focuses more particularly on the economic 
barriers to deployment due to liability faced by proponents of CCS.  
Although I agree that the patchwork of liability provisions must also 
be resolved to ensure protection of the public, I do not delve into this 
with the detail addressed by Klass and Wilson. 
A. Current Liability Schemes That Might Apply  without Legislative 
Changes 
There are four general causes of action that may arise in the 
event of a CO2 release.  These claims contain similar elements, but 
some claims may be better suited for particular sets of facts.  In 
addition, there exists the possibility of claims of harm arising from 
climate change. 
1. Negligence 
The most likely cause of action would be a general negligence 
claim that could cover a wide variety of harms.62  A negligence claim 
could be used to address harm to human and environmental health, 
and to property.63  In order to prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff 
would have to prove four elements: duty, breach, causation, and 
damages.  The plaintiff would have to show that the operator had a 
duty of care over the CCS operation, that the operator breached that 
duty, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by that breach.64  
Damages could be in the form of either property damage or damage 
to plaintiff’s health.65 
 
available at http://www.gwpc.org/e-library/documents/co2/IOGCC%20Master%20CO2 
%20Regulatory%20Document%209-2007.pdf [hereinafter IOGCC TASK FORCE]. 
 60. De Figueiredo, supra note 56. 
 61. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16. 
 62. See Melanie R. Kay, Environmental Negligence: A Proposal for a New Cause of Action 
for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land, 94 CAL. L. REV. 149, 168–69 (2006). 
 63. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 56. 
 64. See Kay, supra note 62, at 170 (quoting Newhall Land & Farming Co. v. Superior 
Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 334, 349 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)). 
 65. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 55. 
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2. Trespass 
Another claim could be a trespass claim.  As discussed 
previously, CO2 will naturally migrate throughout any reservoir.
66  
This could lead to the CO2 migrating into pore space that is not 
owned by the operator, giving rise to a trespass cause of action.  The 
plaintiff owner would need to show that the unauthorized entry of the 
CO2 into her property prevented her from making use of that pore 
space.67  The remedy for trespass is usually an injunction, payment for 
the loss of property value, and/or costs of restoration.68 
3. Nuisance 
Another possible cause of action is nuisance.  The difference 
between a nuisance claim and a trespass claim is that a nuisance claim 
arises from an interference in the enjoyment of one’s property, while 
a trespass claim arises from an invasion of one’s property.69  Damages 
for nuisance and trespass are virtually identical.70 
4. Strict Liability 
Another possible claim could be a strict liability claim.  Strict 
liability claims are reserved for abnormally dangerous activities under 
sections 519 and 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.71  Under 
strict liability, an operator can be found liable even if she used “all 
possible preventive measures.”72 
5. Climate Change 
The purpose of CCS operations is to reduce the amount of CO2 
emitted into the atmosphere, as GHG emissions are the primary 
cause of atmospheric warming.73  Thus, one other perceived harm that 
could arise from CCS operations is that a major release of CO2 would 
contribute to climate change.  While damage from climate change 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. See id. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. at 56; G. Nelson Smith, III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental 
Litigation: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39, 54 
(1995). 
 70. See de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 56. 
 71. Klass & Wilson, supra note 16, at 141–42. 
 72. De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 58. 
 73. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT, SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 5 (2007). 
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harm is a somewhat novel legal concept, it is a possible uncertainty in 
CCS. 
B. What Should Comprehensive Legislation Look Like? 
Liability regulation in comprehensive legislation should be 
limited to physical harm to humans, animals, and plant life.  Because 
property issues from migration would be similar to existing migratory 
issues for natural gas, which are currently handled under state law, 
claims of property damage in the form of trespass and nuisance 
should probably be left to state law (though consistency at the state 
level would be important in this area). 
With respect to a possible federal liability scheme for health and 
environmental damages, some statutory plan based on requiring 
“reasonable” behavior should be adopted.  A strict liability regime 
should not be adopted for CCS operations, in that it would greatly 
increase the risk of liability costs for CCS operators without 
commensurate benefit to the public. 
If operators take on the burden of implementing CCS 
operations, they should not also be held liable for climate change 
claims.  If liability could be imposed on CCS operators for a CO2 
release that did not cause any harm other than increasing atmospheric 
CO2 levels, an unlikely occurrence given the correct initial standard, 
this scheme would fail to reach the goal of encouraging 
implementation of CCS.  The climate change protections should be 
specified and set out in the original standard.  It seems 
counterproductive to impose climate change liability on operators 
who have undertaken demonstrated efforts to reduce harm from CO2 
emissions, and who have also complied with government mandated 
standards designed to avoid such harm.  If operators are held liable 
for their contribution to climate change because of a CO2 release, 
they will have much less incentive to implement CCS. 
What federal statutory schemes would work?  There are several 
options. 
1. Insurance 
The most commonly used method for managing liability is 
insurance.  Insurance serves three related, but separate, functions. 
First, insurance transfers risk from parties who are comparatively 
risk averse to enterprises more willing to bear risk.  Second, 
insurance spreads risk by combining individual risks [into a general 
pool]. . . . Third, insurance performs a risk-allocation function by 
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charging premiums that reflect the level of risk posed by each 
individual . . . that is insured.74 
Essential to setting proper premium prices and setting aside the 
proper funds in case of an accident for CCS is knowledge of the likely 
frequency and severity of a CCS disaster.  Because CCS is a very new 
technology and there has been no real opportunity to assess the 
frequency and severity of CCS events, CCS is not well suited, at least 
at this point, for actuarial models.75  If private insurance companies 
set premium prices too low, they may be unable to cover the damages 
that stem from a CCS accident.  On the other hand, if insurance 
companies set premiums too high, this could deter possible operators, 
who would otherwise provide a cost effective benefit, from entering 
into the CCS business.  Without a working knowledge of the 
frequency and/or severity of CCS accidents, a private insurance 
scheme, standing alone, would be little more than guesswork and 
probably would not adequately reach both the goals of encouraging 
private industry to implement CCS while protecting public health and 
welfare. 
2. Liability Cap 
Another liability scheme that has worked in other areas is a 
liability cap.  The Price-Anderson Act,76 adopted in 1957, regulates 
liability for the nuclear power industry in the United States.  This act 
allows for a limited liability shield, in that each nuclear plant operator 
must obtain primary insurance coverage up to $300 million.77  In the 
event that damages from a nuclear accident were to exceed the 
primary insurance coverage, recovery could be sought from a 
secondary insurance source, for which each nuclear operator would 
“contribute up to $95.8 million per unit[,] . . . payable in annual 
installments of $15 million or less.”78  If the damages of a nuclear 
accident were ever to exceed both the primary and secondary 
insurance coverage, the nuclear operators would be shielded from any 
amount over the secondary coverage, and the federal government 
would take on the remaining liability.79 
 
 74. E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 942, 945–46 (1988). 
 75. See id. at 960; de Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 62. 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000). 
 77. 10 C.F.R. § 140.11(a)(4) (2008). 
 78. AM. NUCLEAR SOC’Y, THE PRICE-ANDERSON ACT: BACKGROUND INFORMATION 2 
(2005), available at http://www.ans.org/pi/ps/docs/ps54-bi.pdf. 
 79. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (2000). 
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3. Liability Shield 
Another possible scheme would be to grant a complete liability 
shield under other statutes to all CCS operators that have followed 
certain safety rules and regulations as set out by the appropriate 
federal agency.80  Under this scheme, as long as the operator followed 
all CCS safety regulations, a rough equivalency to “acting 
reasonably,” the operator could be completely exempt from all claims 
arising under other statutes.81  This scheme would encourage private 
industry to implement CCS technology by removing the liability costs 
associated with CCS.  This scheme, however, would deprive possible 
victims of necessary compensation unless the federal government 
agreed to take on the liability that would have been borne by the CCS 
operators.  Furthermore, even if the federal government agreed to 
assume this liability, it may not adequately protect the public welfare, 
as CCS operators would have less incentive to follow the 
aforementioned safe practices in implementing CCS.  Thus, while a 
partial liability shield may be plausible with the federal government 
making the claimant whole, a complete liability shield would not be 
the best method to reach the twofold goal of encouraging private 
investment and adequately protecting human and environmental 
health. 
4. Bonding 
Another possibility is bonding.  Typically, the operator or a third 
party would post the bond as a promise of compliance with federal 
regulations.82  The bond would then be released back to the original 
payor when its promise of compliance was fulfilled.83  The main issue 
in this context would be the length of time that the operator would be 
required to comply before his promise would be deemed fulfilled.84  If 
compliance was incomplete or insufficient, the bond would be 
forfeited and used to finance any claims arising from these 
 
 80. This scheme has been used in other environmental statutes, namely CERCLA.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(j) (2000). 
 81. The language used to avoid imposing CERCLA liability on those who have met other 
statutory mandates is: “Recovery by any person (including the United States or any State or 
Indian tribe) for response costs or damages resulting from a federally permitted release shall be 
pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section.”  Id. 
 82. DAVID GERARD & ELIZABETH J. WILSON, ENVIRONMENTAL BONDS AND THE 
PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM CARBON SEQUESTRATION 2 (2006), available at 
www.ecy.wa.gov/laws-rules/wac173407_218/Gerard%20Wilson%20Bonding.pdf. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 14–15. 
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operations.85  Bonding has been used as a liability measure in coal 
mining and hard-rock mining projects.86 
Bonding is less favorable to private investment than a partial 
liability shield because the bond shifts the injured party’s burden of 
proof from proving that the operator was harmed to proving that 
compliance criteria were met.87  At the same time, the public sector is 
only protected up to the amount of the bond posted—not necessarily 
for the full amount of potential damages.88  However, if the operator 
remains solvent after forfeiting its bond, harmed parties may seek 
additional remedies through the court system.89 
5. Compensation Fund 
The final possibility would be to establish a compensation fund.  
In this scheme, those that create the risk, the CCS operators, would 
make payments into a fund that would be used to address any harm 
caused by CCS operations.90  The compensation fund would be 
beneficial to injured parties in that the injured parties would not 
necessarily have to trace their injury to a specific operator.  Instead, 
they would only need to show that their injuries resulted from the 
negligence of any CCS operator in order to be awarded damages 
from the fund. 
Under this scheme, one major issue would be determining how 
much each operator should contribute to the fund.  Payment could be 
based on several factors, including amount of CO2 stored, the 
injection site’s proximity to population centers, and the physical 
characteristics of the reservoir.91 
For several policy reasons, comprehensive CCS legislation 
should probably adopt this strategy.  Under a compensation fund 
scheme, the federal government could collect fees from CCS 
operators to provide funding for injuries resulting from the release of 
CO2.  Any uncertainty with respect to total risk would then be borne 
by the government, rather than the CCS operator.  The legislation 
would have to address three major issues in designing an appropriate 
compensation fund: (1) the method of financing the fund, (2) the 
 
 85. Id. at 3. 
 86. Id. at 3 n.6. 
 87. Id. at 8. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 70. 
 91. Id. at 71. 
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events that are compensable, and (3) the amount of compensation 
awarded to each injured party.92 
With respect to financing, one possibility would be to consider 
the amount of CO2 stored—for instance, the more you inject, the 
more you pay.  Another possibility is a risk-based contribution.93  
Under this model, each operator’s contribution to the fund would be 
determined by: (1) an analysis of the severity of damages that a CO2 
release would cause based on the amount of CO2 stored and its 
proximity to populations centers, and (2) consideration of the 
likelihood of a CO2 leak based on the physical characteristics of the 
reservoir.  De Figueiredo proposes this type of scheme, wherein the 
operator of the site pays a different amount based on the risk of 
leakage and failure.94 
While the risk-based model may seem to be the most fair and 
would most closely align incentives, it faces particular problems in 
this context.  First, it requires extensive scientific analysis and 
calculation, making administration more costly and difficult.  Though 
de Figueiredo assumes that such calculations can be done,95 risk 
analysis over CCS time periods becomes even more difficult.  Such 
difficulty in administration may not even provide much more in the 
way of incentives to operators.  It should be noted that every injection 
site will be subject to the same regulations and safety standards.  
Thus, using the likelihood of a release as a factor in determining each 
operator’s contribution could be a redundant exercise in risk 
evaluation.  If every site is subject to the same safety standards, then 
the amount of CO2 stored, a determination easily made 
administratively, could be the basis of each operator’s contribution.  
In other words, operators that stored similar volumes of CO2 would 
pay the same amount to the fund, regardless of physical 
characteristics and proximity to population centers. 
While this option may prove to be more efficient from an 
administrative point of view, it would not encourage the use of the 
most safe injection sites.  It is possible that proximity to population 
centers could also be converted into a formula for ease of 
administration.  In an effort to establish a contribution model that 
accurately reflects the risk imposed by each operator, contributions 
 
 92. Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of 
Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845, 886 (1987). 
 93. See id. at 890. 
 94. De Figueiredo, supra note 56, at 399. 
 95. Id. 
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should be based on the amount of CO2 injected with an additional 
risk analysis related to proximity to an affected population.  With 
CO2, due to its quick dispersal, this would be a much smaller factor 
than trying to calculate effects of toxic release on the public. 
With respect to determining which events are compensable and 
what the amounts should be, this should probably be designated to 
regulatory discretion.  The types of injuries that could possibly occur 
are not completely understood, and thus we cannot understand 
necessary compensation either.  The EPA has particular expertise in 
determining environmental safety risks and has specifically addressed 
the effects of CO2 on human health.
96  Thus, based on sound 
environmental and actuarial science, both determinations should be 
delegated to the EPA. 
IV.  PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The injection of carbon dioxide into geologic formations is not 
new; it has been used for decades in enhanced oil recovery 
operations.97  However, because of the vast quantities of CO2 that will 
be injected and the long-term storage that is required, CCS 
technology faces several novel challenges, particularly in the area of 
subsurface property rights.98 
A. Ownership Issues Related to CCS Technology 
Geologic storage of immense amounts of carbon dioxide for 
hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of years presents very complex 
property issues.  Carbon dioxide can be sequestered in a number of 
different geologic formations, including depleted oil and gas 
reservoirs, saline aquifers, coal seams, and deep sub-seabed 
formations.99  The geologic formation subject to injection will dictate 
the property rights that are implicated.  MIT’s recent study on the 
Future of Coal notes that “[b]ecause of their large storage potential 
 
 96. See OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CARBON DIOXIDE AS A 
FIRE SUPPRESSANT: EXAMINING THE RISKS app. B (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (2007) 
(setting forth OSHA regulations regarding human exposure to air contaminants, including 
CO2). 
 97. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, CARBON SEQUESTRATION 
THROUGH OIL RECOVERY 1 (2008), available at www.netl.doe.gov/publications/factsheets/ 
program/Prog053.pdf. 
 98. See Elizabeth J. Wilson & Mark A. de Figueiredo, Geologic Carbon Dioxide 
Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, 36 ENVTL. L. REP. 10114, 10116–18 
(2006). 
 99. Id. at 10114. 
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and broad distribution, it is likely that most geological sequestration 
will occur in saline formations.”100  However, the study also concludes 
that most initial carbon sequestration projects will likely utilize 
depleted oil and gas reservoirs because of their availability, the 
quality of existing subsurface data, and the potential for economic 
return.101  Additionally, whether sequestration takes place on-shore or 
off-shore further impacts the legal framework at issue.102  Finally, 
because there is already legal precedent governing the injection of 
carbon dioxide for enhanced oil recovery operations, if the CO2 were 
initially injected for this purpose it is likely that it would be governed 
by that body of law.103 
1. Depleted Oil and Gas Reservoirs 
The injection of carbon dioxide into oil and gas reservoirs 
implicates a number of property interests, including surface owners, 
mineral owners, lessees of solid minerals, oil and gas lessees, owners 
of non-operating interests, owners of future interests, and the rights 
of adjacent property owners.104  In most of the world, subsurface 
minerals and pore space is the property of the central government, 
simplifying consideration of property issues for carbon 
sequestration.105  However, in the United States, mineral rights and 
subsurface pore space ownership on private land are commonly held 
by private parties, adding great complexity to the property rights 
equation. 
The IOGCC Geologic Carbon Dioxide Sequestration Task Force 
has “identified three working models that can provide technological 
and regulatory guidance for [geologic storage]: (1) injection of CO2 
into underground formations for enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 
operations, (2) storage of natural gas in geologic reservoirs, and (3) 
injection of acid gas into underground formations.”106  According to 
the IOGCC Taskforce, the law governing short-term storage of 
natural gas is the most useful for the consideration of CCS.107  
 
 100. MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-
CONSTRAINED WORLD 44 (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf. 
 101. Id. 
 102. INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, PROSPECTS FOR CO2 CAPTURE AND STORAGE 190 (2004). 
 103. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117–18. 
 104. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 15. 
 105. See INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, REGULATION OF CARBON CAPTURE AND 
STORAGE 13 (2008). 
 106. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 15. 
 107. See id. at 15–16. 
Flatt_Fmt4.doc 7/6/2009  12:30:24 PM 
Spring 2009] CARBON SEQUESTRATION 231 
However, each of these legal paradigms should be examined because 
each adds to the understanding of the complexity of the property 
rights at issue. 
a. Enhanced Oil Recovery Operations (EOR) 
Through enhanced oil recovery operations, CO2 is injected into 
an oil and gas reservoir in order to re-pressurize the reservoir and 
increase oil and gas recovery (termed secondary and tertiary 
recovery).108  EOR operations have raised a number of legal questions 
regarding the operator’s liability to adjacent property owners.  While 
the operator has “the right to a fair share of the oil and gas in place 
and a duty to protect the common source of supply[,]” physical 
invasion of a neighboring mineral estate with a substance injected to 
enhance recovery is forbidden.109  As a result, EOR operations will 
generally only take place in a field that has been unitized.110  “With 
‘field unitization,’ oil or gas field leases for resource development are 
combined, thereby creating a field-wide operation; liability is 
removed as a driving concern because production and profits are 
shared by all unit members, and the field is managed in order to 
optimize resource recovery.”111  In EOR operations that have not 
been unitized, liability has been imposed on the operator for mineral 
loss on the basis of trespass and nuisance.112 
In the case of secondary recovery operations, the power of state 
regulatory boards to grant permits for forced unitization has been 
consistently upheld.113  The unitization method may be of particular 
interest in the regulation of CCS given the uncertainty of where the 
CO2 will travel once it is injected into a reservoir.  For example, in 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, the Alabama Supreme Court 
reversed a finding of damages to a landowner’s reservoir that 
 
 108. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The use of field unitization in oil and gas operations is widespread.  Only Texas, the 
largest oil and gas producing state in the United States, does not have a compulsory unitization 
law.  Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Tragedy of the Commons from Spindletop to Enron, 24 J. 
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 187, 187 (2004) (“Such a statute is universally recognized as 
necessary to assure the maximum efficient recovery of oil and gas while also allocating fair 
shares of a field’s bounty to the different operators of leases overlying a common reservoir.”). 
 111. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118. 
 112. Id.  Note that this is not the case in Texas under the “negative rule of capture” 
established in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Manziel, in which the Texas Supreme Court 
held that technical rules of trespass could not defeat a secondary recovery project.  361 S.W.2d 
560, 574 (Tex. 1962). 
 113. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10118. 
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bordered a unitized EOR project, holding that under Alabama law 
the adjacent landowner could have petitioned for inclusion into the 
unitized project in order to protect his underlying reservoir.114  In 
coming to this conclusion, the court stressed the importance of state 
administrative power to create and protect unitization projects. 
b. Hazardous Waste Injection 
Underground injection wells dispose of about fifty percent of the 
liquid hazardous waste produced in the United States; however, this 
amount is very small compared to the enormous quantities of carbon 
dioxide that will be stored in conjunction with CCS projects.115  
Leading case law in this area—premised on trespass, negligence, and 
nuisance—affirms the liability of operators for the intrusion of 
hazardous waste into the pore space of adjacent landowners.116  
However, these cases limit the adjacent landowner’s likelihood of 
recovery by placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff and holding 
that claims for subsurface invasions “are only valid as long as the 
invasions actually interfere with ‘reasonable and foreseeable’ use of 
the subsurface.”117  In other words, the adjacent land owner must 
show that its own mineral operations are actually impacted, or that an 
expectation of profit from the use of pore space storage is impaired. 
c. Natural Gas Storage 
Natural gas is injected into shallow formations for temporary 
storage to maintain reserves.118  The storage of natural gas in depleted 
reservoirs is not entirely analogous to the storage of carbon dioxide, 
as natural gas is generally stored for very short periods of time to 
provide for increased demand in winter months.119  In addition, 
because natural gas itself is a valuable commodity, unlike hazardous 
wastes or CO2 in this context, ownership of the injected gas has also 
been an issue.  Thus, there are actually two separate issues to consider 
 
 114. Id. (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Stryker, 723 So. 2d 585 (Ala. 1998)). 
 115. Id. at 10119. 
 116. Id. at 10119–20 (citing Mongrue v. Monsanto, 249 F.3d 422 (5th Cir. 2001); Chance v. 
BP Chem., Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985 (Ohio 1996)). 
 117. Id. at 10120. 
 118. Moore, supra note 29, at 461.  Note that natural gas can also be stored in suitable salt 
caverns and natural aquifers.  Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121. 
 119. Also, note that natural gas injection is exempt from regulation under the Underground 
Injection Control (UIC) program.  Moore, supra note 29, at 462.  However, the EPA and U.S. 
courts have held that CO2 is not a “natural gas” under the UIC program or the Safe Water 
Drinking Act.  Id. (citing Arco Oil & Gas Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 14 F.3d 1431, 1436 (10th 
Cir. 1993)). 
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when examining the law of natural gas storage: (1) the ownership of 
the injected gas, and (2) the ownership of the associated pore space. 
 i. Ownership of the Injected Natural Gas 
State law has held that the natural gas injected into underground 
reservoirs remains the property of the injecting operator.120  This has 
been found to be the case even where the injected natural gas 
migrated to an adjacent property owner’s reservoir where the 
operator had not obtained storage rights:121 “The storing party was 
found to have retained ownership rights even though the gas had 
migrated to production wells that were on the third party’s land not 
within the designated storage area.”122 
 ii. Ownership of the Pore Space 
The property law of each state will control ownership of the 
depleted oil and gas reservoir pore space.  There is no clear consensus 
on whether the ownership of the pore space lies with the surface 
estate or the mineral estate, and consideration of these rights varies 
significantly from state to state.123  The two primary theories 
governing pore space ownership are termed the American Rule and 
the English Rule. 
Under the American Rule, once subsurface minerals have been 
removed from the pore space, the surface owner—and not the 
mineral owner—retains the right to use the depleted space for 
storage.124  In essence, the mineral estate owner only has the right to 
the actual minerals, not to the reservoir containing those minerals.  
This view has been adopted by a number of states, including 
Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Michigan.125  However, a Michigan court 
was careful to note that any oil or natural gas that remains in the pore 
space can serve to preclude the surface owner from using the 
reservoir for storage.126  Because certain amounts of oil and natural 
gas typically remain in formations even after recovery operations are 
completed, use of pore space for CCS may be complicated even in 
states where ownership clearly lies with the surface owner.  The 
 
 120. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121. 
 121. Id. (citing Natural Gas Co. v. Mahon & Rowsey, Inc., 786 F.2d 1004 (10th Cir. 1986); 
Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. Ct. App. 1962)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 16–19. 
 124. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121. 
 125. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 17–18. 
 126. Id. (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Goike, 560 N.W.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)). 
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owner of the mineral estate (and of any leased, operating, or future 
interests thereto) would retain an interest in the pore space for which 
he would have to be compensated. 
Conversely, under the English Rule, which is followed in much of 
Canada as well as Kentucky, the mineral owner retains the rights to 
the subsurface pore space even after all minerals are extracted.127  
Complicating matters further, there are a number of states where the 
ownership of pore space has not been addressed or remains unsettled.  
This is of particular concern in Texas, where there is no clear general 
rule on pore space ownership unless it has been specified by 
contract.128 
Legal commentators have also failed to come to any consensus as 
to the rightful ownership of pore space as between the mineral and 
surface estates.  In their article entitled Geologic Carbon Dioxide 
Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface Property Law, authors 
Elizabeth J. Wilson and Mark A. de Figueiredo conclude that while a 
majority of states adopt the view that the surface owner has rights to 
the spent reservoir space, mineral owners often retain a valid interest, 
so it is in the best interest of the entity who wishes to obtain rights to 
the pore space to compensate all estate owners.129  In contrast, 
Williams and Meyers argue in their treatise on oil and gas law that the 
mineral estate, as the dominant estate, should retain ownership of the 
associated pore space, even after the minerals are depleted.130 
2. Saline Formations 
The property rights concerning saline aquifers are dependent on 
a separate legal regime governing groundwater rights.131  Wilson and 
de Figueiredo have explored this legal system extensively.132  While 
there is a developed body of law on the use of depleted oil and gas 
reservoirs for natural gas storage, there is virtually no case law on the 
use of saline aquifers for storage and associated property rights.133  
Rather, water law has focused on property rights concerning the use 
 
 127. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10121; IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, 
at 18–19. 
 128. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 16. 
 129. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10123. 
 130. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 20 (citing PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. 
KRAMER, 1 WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL & GAS LAW § 222 (2006)). 
 131. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117. 
 132. See Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98. 
 133. Id. at 10117. 
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of groundwater for consumption.134  “In general, states follow one of 
five major doctrines with respect to ownership of groundwater rights: 
(1) absolute dominion, (2) reasonable use, (3) correlative rights, (4) 
the [R]estatement rule, or (5) prior appropriation.”135 
Pursuant to the absolute dominion rule, the owner of the surface 
estate has “absolute dominion” over all resources on, above, or below 
his property, including any underlying aquifer.136  The “absolute 
dominion” owner may make any use of the underlying aquifer 
without risk of liability to an adjoining landowner. 137 
The next three doctrines are all essentially variants of the 
reasonable use rule.  The reasonable use owner may also use 
underlying groundwater without restriction, as long as that use is 
reasonable and beneficial to the land itself.138  The correlative rights 
rule is similar, except that owners over an aquifer are held to have 
apportioned shares of the aquifer dependent upon the amount of 
their land that overlies the resource.139  The Restatement rule, based 
on section 858 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is very similar to 
the reasonable use rule with the exception that it allows use of the 
groundwater outside of the land overlying the aquifer.140  An owner 
will be liable to adjacent property owners for unreasonable use that 
harms the aquifer.141 
Finally, under the prior appropriation rule, which is used 
throughout most of the American West, the first person to make 
beneficial use of a water source establishes precedence over its 
continued use.  However, some states have imposed a reasonable use 
requirement on this doctrine.142 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Judith Royster, Indian Tribal Rights to Groundwater, 15 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489, 
499 (2006). 
 139. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Western Growth and Sustainable Water 
Use: If There Are No “Natural Limits,” Should We Worry About Water Supplies?, 27 PUB. LAND 
& RESOURCES L. REV. 33, 51 (2006). 
 140. R. Timothy Weston, Harmonizing Management of Ground and Surface Water Use 
under Eastern Water Law Regimes, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 239, 252 (2008). 
 141. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10117. 
 142. Id. 
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a. Condemnation and Compensation 
Given the implications of subsurface trespass law outlined above, 
establishing a reservoir for use in CCS will almost certainly require 
the purchase of all property rights that could be impacted by the 
project or the use of some sort of unitization process.  The creation of 
such a geologic storage unit could potentially take months or years of 
negotiation, and some property interests will likely be adverse to use 
of their pore space for storage at all.  The solutions to these problems 
are at least partially addressed by consideration of condemnation 
under natural gas law. 
The Natural Gas Act of 1938143 “provides for eminent domain for 
the construction of interstate natural gas pipelines,” a power which 
the courts have held extends to the construction of underground 
storage facilities.144  “Thus, if a gas company is unable to directly 
contract with property owners for storage rights, it can still obtain 
subsurface rights for storage by initiating condemnation procedures in 
a state or federal court.”145  If a reservoir is not interstate, then 
corresponding state condemnation laws must be used. 
Most state statutes also provide for voluntary and involuntary 
unitization procedures.  While these laws are currently focused on 
unitization for the purpose of mineral extraction, they could be useful 
in the establishment of a reservoir for CCS operations.  Under 
involuntary unitization, once a certain percentage of owners in the 
field agree to unitization (anywhere from fifty to eighty-five percent), 
an application may be submitted to the state oil and gas or natural 
resources commission, and if the application is approved, a unit is 
created.146  Thereafter, the remaining property interests will be 
compelled to participate in the unitized project, and are entitled to 
receipt of a portion of the proceeds. 
Methods for compensation for natural gas storage remain 
uncertain.  This issue was explored in depth in Columbia Gas 
Transmission Corp. v. An Exclusive Gas Storage Easement.147  The 
 
 143. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006). 
 144. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10122 (citing Columbia Gas Transmission 
Corp. v. Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d 125, 128 (6th Cir. 1985); Steven D. McGrew, 
Selected Issues in Federal Condemnations for Underground Natural Gas Storage Rights: 
Valuation Methods, Inverse Condemnation, and Trespass, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 131, 138–40 
(2000)). 
 145. Wilson & de Figueiredo, supra note 98, at 10122. 
 146. Id. at 10119 (citing U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 
POTENTIAL IN THE UNITED STATES 234 (1978)). 
 147. Id. at 10122 (citing Exclusive Gas Storage Easement, 776 F.2d at 128). 
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Sixth Circuit’s analysis suggested that an award of “fair market value” 
could be based on any of the following methods: 
comparable sales of easements for natural gas in the particular 
formation; present value calculation (if sufficient natural gas exists 
for commercial recovery) of the “foreseeable net income flow from 
the property for its foreseeable life”; capitalization of rental income 
for the right to store gas, calculated by multiplying the area to be 
rented with the value of comparable storage rights; calculation of 
the depreciation of the entire tract from the taking of the easement 
used for storage; calculating the difference of the market value of 
the property before and after the taking; mineral lease value, and 
viewpoint value, i.e. the value calculated from the point of view of 
the landowner.148 
While this case served to clarify the method of awarding fair market 
value for natural gas storage in subsurface formations in Ohio, the 
law of valuation remains unclear in most states and is largely 
undecided.149 
b. Spectrum of Property Rights at Issue 
As evidenced by the above discussion, the property rights at 
issue for any CCS project will depend upon both the geologic 
formation in which the CO2 is injected, as well as the state law 
governing the particular type of formation.  Any legal and regulatory 
framework for the promotion of CCS would have to take into 
account, at a minimum, the following property interests. 
(1) Ownership of subsurface rights 
a. Storage in oil and gas reservoirs 
b. Storage in saline aquifers (separate legal regime) 
c. Storage in sub-seabed formations 
d. Pore space ownership issues 
e. Trespass and liability issues 
(2) Ownership of surface rights 
a. Pore space ownership issues (overlap with subsurface 
 rights) 
b. Access and construction of facilities 
(3) Severed Estate Issues 
a. Lessees of solid minerals 
b. Oil and gas lessees 
c. Owners of non-operating interests 
 
 148. Id. (citation omitted). 
 149. Id. 
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d. Owners of future interests 
e. Rights of adjacent property owners 
(4) Condemnation and unitization 
a. Condemnation 
b. Voluntary unitization 
c. Compulsory unitization 
(5) Short-term ownership and liability issues 
(6) Long-term ownership and liability issues 
B.  How Comprehensive Federal Legislation Should Deal with 
Ownership Issues 
Due to the spectrum of property interests at issue, the diversity 
of treatment of these interests between the states and the reliance 
upon the states of these regimes governing existing CO2 injection 
sites, federal law should not completely preempt this area of state 
property law as part of any comprehensive CCS federal legislation.  
Of particular concern is the risk of takings claims from each of these 
diverse property interests if federal law were to preempt in this area.  
Also of concern is the large extent of well-developed state property 
law that would be preempted through federal legislation, and how 
this preemptive legislation would interact with non-preempted state 
property law. 
Furthermore, the IOGCC Task Force report, which has been 
widely cited by commentators, specifically recommends that “given 
the jurisdiction, experience, and expertise of states and provinces in 
the regulation of oil and natural gas production and natural gas 
storage in the United States and Canada, the states and provinces 
would be the most logical and experienced regulators of the geologic 
storage of carbon dioxide.”150  In keeping with this recommendation, 
the Task Force further recommended that rather than imposing a 
legal property framework on the states for the promotion of CCS 
technology, “control of the necessary storage rights should be 
required as part of the initial [Geological Storage Unit (GSU)] site 
licensing to promote orderly development and maximize utilization of 
the GSU,” thus essentially leaving the question of site ownership to 
established state law.151 
 
 150. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 3. 
 151. Id. at 27. 
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Rather than completely preempting this area of property law, 
federal legislation could include limited federal statutory authority for 
certain key elements and propose a type of model state legislation 
that could be adopted by states with less developed or unclear rules in 
order to better facilitate the proposed federal scheme.  Such a model 
state legislation could be based on the more robust property regimes 
of the states that have examined this area.  This preserves existing 
state law, but ensures that CCS operators in states without developed 
law would have a guide or proposal for moving ahead.  An example 
of model legislation is provided in the Appendix.  It addresses a 
number of factors that are of particular concern to subsurface 
property rights and should help to facilitate CCS deployment, 
including ownership of subsurface pore space and impacts on surface 
and mineral estates, state condemnation provisions, a post-closure 
ownership scheme, and unitization procedures.152 
Federal legislation could address some aspects of CCS without 
preempting state law.  Federal legislation should provide that no 
sequestration project may be permitted without ownership of all 
necessary property rights.  If an operator could not secure all 
necessary property rights after legitimate and fair negotiations, 
federal legislation could further provide for condemnation 
proceedings for interstate projects modeled after the Natural Gas Act 
of 1938.153  Under this statute, if eminent domain powers are 
exercised, the federal legislation provides for compensation of the 
property owner at fair market value.154  The EPA, as the proposed 
CCS regulatory agency, could promulgate regulations establishing the 
method for determination of fair market value. 
Federal legislation should also clearly provide that any right of 
eminent domain granted pursuant to the statute will not prejudice the 
owners of the land to other uses of the property not acquired for the 
storage facility.  A similar condemnation procedure for intra-state 
reservoirs is also provided for in the model state statute.155 
With a proposed liability scheme, federal legislation could also 
adopt a long-term ownership transfer and release of liability scheme 
that should help address concerns about long-term storage liability 
issues that are inherent to CCS.  Under the laws governing natural 
 
 152. This statutory language borrows heavily from similar statutes recently passed in 
Wyoming.  See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1-152, 34-1-202, 30-5-501, 35-11-313 (2008). 
 153. 15 U.S.C. § 717 (2006). 
 154. Id. 
 155. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, app. 1. 
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gas storage, it is apparent that the injecting operator will retain 
ownership rights of the injected carbon dioxide, even if it were to 
migrate outside the designated receiving reservoir.  This retention of 
ownership raises important issues regarding long-term monitoring 
and liability for the stored CO2.  Commentators have noted that the 
only entities that are likely equipped to reliably handle the long-term 
storage requirements of carbon dioxide are state and federal 
governments.156 
Given these issues, federal legislation should adopt the post-
closure property transfer and release of liability provisions (in 
primary part) proposed by the IOGCC Task Force in their 2007 
report on Storage of Carbon Dioxide in Geologic Structures, to the 
extent it is consistent with overall provisions on liability.  The Task 
Force, which was sponsored by the Department of Energy, included 
members from the IOGCC, state agencies, federal agencies from both 
the United States and Canada, industry representatives, academic and 
professional representatives, and environmental advocates.  This 
diverse membership suggested a framework for long-term liability 
and property ownership that appears to be a workable solution for 
the promotion of CCS technology.  The primary components are 
summarized as follows: 
  Closure is proposed to be divided into a Closure Period and 
Post-Closure Period.  The Closure Period is defined as that period 
of time when the plugging of the injection wells (excluding wells to 
be used as observation wells as agreed upon between the [CO2 
Storage Project (CSP)] Operator and the [State Regulatory 
Agency]) is completed and continuing until a future date is 
reached, defined as some period of time (10 or 29 years, etc.) after 
injection activities and the injection wells are plugged.  During this 
Closure Period, the operator of the CSP would be the responsible 
party and be required to maintain the CSP operational bond and 
individual or blanket well bonds specified in Section 4.  The 
individual well bonds will be released as the wells are plugged. At 
the conclusion of the Closure Period, the operational bond would 
be released and the liability for ensuring that the CSP remains a 
secure storage site during the Post-Closure Period would transfer to 
the state. 
  During the Post-Closure Period the financial resources 
necessary for the state or a state contracted entity to engage in 
future monitoring, verification, and remediation activities would be 
provided by a state-administered trust fund.157 
 
 156. INT’L RISK GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, supra note 105, at 23. 
 157. IOGCC TASK FORCE, supra note 59, at 29. 
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The IOGCC scheme could be modified somewhat to conform to 
other liability elements in federal legislation.  For example, during the 
Post-Closure Period, ownership could transfer to the United States, 
instead of a state, under a comprehensive liability scheme. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Jurisdiction, liability, and property rights are not the only issues 
that must be addressed in a comprehensive CCS statutory scheme.  
Other regulatory barriers need to be addressed as well.  For instance, 
what regimes should govern Tribal Lands managed in the Federal 
Indian Trust System for which states may not have the right to 
regulate minerals?158  Sequestering CO2 offshore is also a viable 
economic option for CCS.  But since offshore sequestration involves 
different jurisdictional issues, those must be addressed as well.  Last, 
the potential for other state and federal laws to impede deployment 
of CCS must be examined as well.  Many policy decisions would need 
to be addressed and the Environment, Energy, and Natural 
Resources Center at the University of Houston Law Center has 
attempted to address some of them through its research and draft 
legislative proposal for comprehensive CCS legislation. 
There are genuine differences in how the policy questions of 
liability burden and property rights should be addressed.  The 
approach taken in this article is not the only one.  However, it is clear 
that there are serious regulatory questions that must be addressed to 
reduce the uncertainties facing those who would be the first adopters 
of CCS.  Because of the importance of CCS to reducing GHG 
emissions, this statutory undertaking should be one of President 
Obama’s most important natural resource priorities. 
 
 158. See Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes v. Bd. of Oil & Gas Conservation, 792 F.2d 782, 796 
(9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the Bureau of Land Management may preclude states from 
managing mineral resources on Indian Trust land). 
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APPENDIX 
MODEL STATE/TRIBAL LEGISLATION 
SECTION 1: OWNERSHIP OF PORE SPACE 
 
Subchapter I. As used in this section, the term “pore space” 
is defined to mean subsurface space which can be used as storage 
space for carbon dioxide or other substances. 
Subchapter II. The ownership of all pore space below surface 
lands and waters of the state is declared to be vested in the owner of 
the surface estate. 
Subchapter III. A conveyance of the surface estate shall be a 
conveyance of the pore space in all strata below the surface of such 
real property unless the ownership interest in such pore space 
previously has been severed from the surface ownership or is 
explicitly excluded in the conveyance. 
Subchapter IV. The ownership of pore space in strata may be 
conveyed in any manner provided by law for the transfer of mineral 
interests in real property.  No agreement conveying mineral or other 
interests underlying the surface estate shall act to convey ownership 
of any pore space unless the agreement explicitly conveys that 
ownership interest. 
Subchapter V.  Nothing in this section shall be construed to 
change or alter the state or common law as it relates to the rights 
belonging to, or the dominance of, the mineral estate. 
Subchapter VI.   All instruments which transfer the rights to 
pore space under this section shall describe the scope of any right to 
use the surface estate.  The owner of any pore space right shall have 
no right to use the surface estate beyond that set out in a properly 
recorded instrument. 
Subchapter VII. Transfers of pore space rights made after 
_________________ (date of enactment) are null and void at the 
option of the owner of the surface estate if the transfer instrument 
does not contain a specific description of the location of the pore 
space being transferred. The description may include, but is not 
limited to, a subsurface geologic or seismic survey or a metes and 
bounds description of the surface lying over the transferred pore 
space.  In the event a description of the surface is used, the transfer 
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shall be deemed to include pore space at all depths underlying the 
described surface area unless specifically excluded.  The validity of 
pore space rights under this paragraph shall not affect the respective 
liabilities of any party, and such liabilities shall operate in the same 
manner as if the pore space transfer were valid. 
Subchapter VIII. Nothing in this section shall alter, amend, 
diminish or invalidate rights to the use of subsurface pore space that 
were acquired by contract or lease prior to ___________ (date of 
enactment). 
Subchapter IX. It is the intent of the legislature to clarify the 
ownership of pore space underlying the surface of the lands and 
waters of this state.  All conveyances of interests in real property on 
and after __________________ (date of enactment) shall be subject to 
the provisions of this Act.  All conveyances of real property made 
prior to ___________________ (date of enactment) shall be construed 
in accordance with the provisions of this act unless a person claiming 
an ownership interest contrary to the provisions of this act establishes 
such ownership by a preponderance of the evidence in an action to 
establish ownership of such interest. 
SECTION 2: EMINENT DOMAIN AUTHORITY 
(a) When any owner or operator of a sequestration project that 
has been licensed in accordance with the Act, cannot acquire by 
contract, or is unable to agree with the owner of property as to the 
compensation to be paid, all surface and subsurface property rights 
and interests necessary for construction and operation of the 
sequestration project, including, but not limited to, all necessary 
rights-of-way to construct, operate and maintain all pipelines, 
compressor stations, pressure apparatus, or other stations or 
necessary equipment or facilities, the owner or operator may acquire 
the same by the exercise of the right of eminent domain in the state 
courts. 
(b) Owners of property subject to eminent domain authority 
shall be compensated at fair market value.  The State environmental 
regulatory agency may promulgate regulations establishing the 
method for determination of fair market value. 
(c) The right of eminent domain granted in this section shall not 
prejudice the rights of the owners of said land or other rights or 
interests therein as to all other uses not acquired for the storage 
facility. 
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SECTION 3: UNITIZATION 
(a) The State Regulatory Agency, upon its own motion, or upon 
the petition by any interested party, shall conduct a hearing to 
consider the need for the operation as a unit of an entire pool or any 
portion thereof, in order to facilitate the use of the pore space for the 
storage of carbon dioxide or other substances. 
(b) The State Regulatory Agency shall issue an order requiring 
unit operations, if it finds that: 
 1. Operation of the pool or any portion thereof is necessary 
to prevent waste, to facilitate use of the pore space for carbon dioxide 
or other substances, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, and to 
protect the correlative rights of the property owners; 
 2. The unit operation of the pool or any portion thereof is 
reasonably necessary in order to carry on proper development, 
maintenance or other operations. 
(c) The order issued by the State Regulatory Agency shall be 
upon terms and conditions that are just and reasonable for unit 
operations and shall include: 
  1.  A description of the pool or portion thereof, to be so 
operated, termed the unit area; 
  2. A statement of the nature of the operations 
contemplated; 
  3. A just and reasonable allocation to the separately owned 
tracts in the unit area for the injection of all carbon dioxide or other 
substances into the unit area; 
  4. A provision for the credits and charges to be made in the 
adjustment among the owners in the unit area for their interest in 
wells, tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, and equipment contributed 
to the unit operations; 
 5. The time when the unit operations shall commence, and 
the manner in which, and the circumstances under which, the unit 
operations and the unit shall terminate and be dissolved; 
  6. Such additional provisions that are found to be 
appropriate for carrying on the unit operations, and for the 
prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights. 
(d) General Provisions: 
  1. The State Regulatory Agency may approve additions to 
the unit portions of pools not previously included within the unit and 
may extend the unit area as necessary.  The State Regulatory Agency 
may approve reductions to the unit area as necessary.  An order 
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adding to or deleting from the unit area shall be upon terms that are 
just and reasonable. 
  2. A property owner not included in the original unit may 
petition for inclusion into the unit area. 
  3. All operations, including, but not limited to, the 
commencement, drilling, or operation of a site upon any portion of 
the unit area shall be deemed for all purposes the conduct of such 
operations upon each separately owned tract in the unit area by the 
several owners thereof. 
  4. The State Regulatory Agency, upon its own motion, or 
upon the petition by any owner, may for good cause terminate unit 
operations and dissolve the unit. 
SECTION 4: TRUST FUND, LIABILITY RELEASE, AND TRANSFER OF 
OWNERSHIP 
(a) Establishment of Trust Fund.  There is hereby established a 
Carbon Dioxide Storage Facility Trust Fund to be administered by 
the State Regulatory Agency.  There is hereby levied on the Owner 
or Operator a fee equal to ____ for each ton of carbon dioxide 
injected for storage for the purposes of funding the Carbon Dioxide 
Geologic Storage Trust Fund.  The Trust Fund shall be utilized solely 
for the long-term monitoring and maintenance of the site and storage 
facility, including, but not limited to, maintenance and monitoring of 
remaining surface facilities and wells, remediation of mechanical 
problems associated with remaining wells and surface infrastructure, 
repairing mechanical leaks at the site, and plugging and abandoning 
remaining wells under the jurisdiction of the State Regulatory 
Agency for use as observation wells.  The Trust Fund shall be 
administered by the Administrator. 
(b) Liability Release/Transfer of Ownership.  Ten years, or some 
other timeframe as established by rule, after cessation of operations, 
the State Regulatory Agency shall issue a Certificate of Completion 
of Injection Operations, upon a showing by the Owner or Operator 
that the reservoir is reasonably expected to retain mechanical 
integrity and remain emplaced, at which time ownership to the 
remaining project, including the stored carbon dioxide, transfers to 
the State. 
(c) Upon issuance of the Certificate of Completion of Injection 
Operations, the owner or operator, and all generators of any injected 
carbon dioxide, shall be released from all further liability associated 
with the project.  This section shall have no impact on the 
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Compensation Fund and associated regulations, which Fund will 
remain in effect at all times regardless of ownership of the pore space 
and stored carbon dioxide. 
 
